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Abstract 
Can the right to health, and particularly the core obligations of states specified under this right, assist 
in formulating and implementing universal health coverage (UHC), now included in the post-2015 
Sustainable Development Goals? In this paper, we examine how core obligations under the right to 
health could lead to a version of UHC that is likely to advance equity and rights. We first address the 
affinity between the right to health and UHC as evinced through changing definitions of UHC and the 
health domains that UHC explicitly covers. We then engage with relevant interpretations of the right 
to health, including core obligations. We turn to analyze what core obligations might bring to UHC, 
particularly in defining what and who is covered. Finally, we acknowledge some of the risks associated 
with both UHC and core obligations and consider potential avenues for mitigating these risks. 
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Introduction 
Can the right to health, and particularly the core 
obligations of states specified under this right, 
assist in formulating and implementing universal 
health coverage (UHC), now included in the post-
2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)?1 This 
question has driven research under the Go4Health 
Consortium, which seeks to embed rights-based 
approaches in the post-2015 SDG health agenda. 
The Go4Health Consortium, of which all authors 
are a part, focuses on what the right to health of-
fers discursively and substantively to this agenda 
and aims to clarify the contributions of the core 
obligations that flow from the right to health.2 
Rights language frames health—not as an exter-
nality, investment, or issue of compassion but as a 
legal entitlement and fundamental matter of social 
justice.3 Thus, framing global health as a question 
of human rights guides our understanding of it, 
identifying the actors that must be engaged and 
the legally prescribed measures needed to achieve 
it.4 In this paper, we examine how core obligations 
under the right to health could lead to a version 
of UHC that is more likely to advance equity and 
rights. In adopting so specific a focus on core ob-
ligations and UHC, we do not intend to obscure or 
delegitimize important investigations of what the 
larger right to health canon brings to elaborating 
and implementing UHC. Indeed, the current 
authors have produced a significant amount of 
scholarship focused on this question, exploring 
what right-to-health components and mechanisms 
(such as progressive realization and indicators) 
bring to UHC.5 This paper adopts a far narrower 
focus on what core obligations might offer to UHC, 
since irrespective of their interpretive deficits and 
scholarly contestation, core obligations remain a 
fundamental component of contemporary inter-
pretations of the right to health.6 To this extent, 
this analysis complements discussions of the right 
to health’s broader contribution to formulating and 
implementing the SDGs.
To explore the question of what core obligations 
bring to UHC, we first address the affinity between 
the right to health and UHC as evinced through 
changing definitions of UHC and the health do-
mains that UHC explicitly covers. We then engage 
with relevant interpretations of the right to health, 
including core obligations. We turn to analyze what 
core obligations might bring to UHC, particularly 
in defining what and who is covered. Finally, we 
acknowledge some of the risks associated with both 
UHC and core obligations and consider potential 
avenues for mitigating these risks. 
UHC and the right to health 
Given that the goal of UHC has strong synergies 
with the commitment to universalism enshrined 
within the right to health, UHC should be rooted 
explicitly within this right.7 This view is shared by 
the World Health Organization (WHO) and other 
institutional actors, who see UHC as a “practical 
expression of health equity and the right to health” 
and “deeply embedded” in international law.8 In 
2012, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly 
endorsed this view when it called on states to realize 
UHC while reaffirming the right to health.9 More 
recently, WHO has expanded on this conception: 
To support the goal of universal health coverage is 
also to express concern for equity and for honoring 
everyone’s right to health. These are personal and 
moral choices regarding the kind of society that peo-
ple wish to live in, taking universal coverage beyond 
the technicalities of health financing, public health 
and clinical care.10 
However, at a practical level, what does the right to 
health imply for UHC, particularly regarding the 
crucial questions of the type of health care required 
to advance the right to health? This has been less 
clear, not least because of a lack of clarity around 
what is meant by UHC.11
Changing definitions of UHC 
The 2005 World Health Assembly resolution call-
ing for UHC had a strong focus on financing and 
insurance (as its title suggests), defining UHC as 
“access to key promotive, preventive, curative and 
rehabilitative health interventions for all at an af-
fordable cost, thereby achieving equity in access.”12 
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It urged member states “to ensure that health-fi-
nancing systems include a method for prepayment 
of financial contributions for health care, with 
a view to sharing risk among the population and 
avoiding catastrophic health-care expenditure and 
impoverishment of individuals as a result of seeking 
care.”13 The 2010 World Health Report did little to 
clarify the content of these services but brought the 
UHC cube, originally designed by Reinhard Busse 
et al., to a wide audience.14 The cube identified three 
key dimensions around which to measure prog-
ress toward UHC: the range of services available, 
the proportion of costs of services covered, and 
the proportion of the population covered. While 
the report acknowledged that funding constraints 
would mean “trade-offs between the proportions of 
the population to be covered, the range of services 
to be made available and the proportion of the total 
costs to be met,” it reiterated that UHC nonetheless 
meant that the “entire population in all these coun-
tries has the right to use a set of services (prevention, 
promotion, treatment and rehabilitation).”15 
The UN General Assembly resolution in 2012 
offered a fuller, multidimensional definition of 
UHC, requiring that 
[a]ll people have access, without discrimination, to 
nationally determined sets of the needed promotive, 
preventive, curative and rehabilitative basic health 
services and essential, safe, affordable, effective 
and quality medicines, while ensuring that the 
use of these services does not expose the users to 
financial hardship, with a special emphasis on the 
poor, vulnerable and marginalized segments of the 
population.16 
This resolution offered definitive UN member state 
political support for UHC, not only reaffirming, 
in explicit and detailed terms, everyone’s right to 
health but also recognizing “the responsibility of 
Governments to urgently and significantly scale 
up efforts to accelerate the transition towards uni-
versal access to affordable and quality health-care 
services.”17 This emphasis on non-discriminatory 
access to basic health services and essential med-
icines with a special focus on the poor, vulnerable, 
and marginalized indicates a clear commitment 
to human rights principles. Emphasizing non-dis-
criminatory access seeks to ensure that UHC does 
not simply lead to aggregate gains at the expense of 
the poor; at the same time, it is important to avoid 
the risk that an exclusive focus on the poor and 
vulnerable will lead to services that are selective—
and thus potentially of poor quality—rather than 
comprehensive.18 
This trajectory from key to basic to essential 
services is reflected in the somewhat terser final 
SDG 3.8 formulation, which commits states to 
“achieve universal health coverage, including fi-
nancial risk protection, access to quality essential 
health-care services and access to safe, effective, 
quality and affordable essential medicines and 
vaccines for all.” While the inclusion of UHC in 
the health SDG reflects a victory for its proponents, 
there are nonetheless questions about the priority 
accorded this target vis-à-vis the other nine targets 
associated with this goal. Moreover, the definition 
of UHC in the SDGs raises more questions than 
it answers: What does financial risk protection 
encompass? Can UHC be achieved through selec-
tive health care rather than comprehensive health 
system strengthening? And crucially, what should 
essential health care and medicines encompass? 
Due to space limitations, the remainder of this pa-
per will focus on this last question alone. 
What essential health care and medicines 
does UHC cover?
The health domains which UHC should cover are 
indicated in the remainder of the SDG health goal, 
where separate targets are specified for essential 
health care services. These include goals and tar-
gets in relation to maternal and child mortality, 
infectious and noncommunicable diseases, mental 
health, sexual and reproductive health, tobacco 
control and substance abuse, environmental pol-
lution, health financing, and global health risk 
management.
These domains are fleshed out by the In-
ter-Agency Expert Group on SDG indicators 
(IAEG-SDGs), established by the United Nations 
Statistical Commission and tasked with proposing 
indicators for each SDG target.19 The IAEG-SDGs, 
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which is composed of member states along with 
agency observers, initially proposed two in-
dicators for UHC: one to monitor coverage of 
tracer interventions (such as complete childhood 
immunization, antiretroviral therapy, TB treat-
ment, hypertension treatment, and skilled birth 
attendance) and the other to monitor the portion 
of the population protected against catastrophic 
or impoverishing out-of-pocket health expendi-
tures.20 Perhaps reflecting the contentious nature of 
the UHC goal (SDG 3.8), in contrast to the other 
SDG 3 indicators these are the only indicators on 
which there was no general agreement within the 
IAEG-SDG team. The team classified the UHC 
indicators as requiring more in-depth discussion 
and methodological development. It is notable that 
the proposed SDG 3.8.2 indicator on catastrophic 
expenditure has now been replaced by one that 
aims to measure the number of individuals covered 
by health insurance or a public health system per 
1,000 people.21 The new indicator has been critiqued 
for measuring aggregate outcomes and thus ignor-
ing the kind of catastrophic and impoverishing 
expenditures addressed by the former indicator.22 
It is anticipated that indicators, including SDG 
3.8.2, will not be finalized until the UN Statistical 
Commission’s March 2017 session.23 Certainly, as 
currently formulated, SDG 3.8.2 would encourage 
models of UHC that provide selective interventions 
financed by insurance—an approach unlikely to 
improve equity in access or outcomes.24 
The “content” indicator covering tracer inter-
ventions is further specified in various domains 
of promotion, prevention, and treatment which 
will act as a global core subset of indicators that 
all countries are expected to implement.25 More-
over, countries are expected to develop additional 
national indicators that reflect “their level of devel-
opment, epidemiological situation, health system 
and people’s expectations” and that “cover pro-
motion, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation and 
palliation.”26 These tracer interventions appear to be 
based largely on a WHO and World Bank publica-
tion which proposes selecting tracer interventions 
according to the criteria of relevance, quality, and 
availability. In relation to prevention services, the 
publication clarifies that
six indicators are identified: satisfaction of family 
planning needs, at least four antenatal care visits, 
measles vaccination in children, improved water 
source, adequate sanitation and non-use of tobacco. 
For treatment services, another six indicators are 
identified for five areas of intervention: skilled birth 
attendance, antiretroviral therapy, tuberculosis case 
detection and treatment success (combined into a 
single indicator), hypertension treatment and dia-
betes treatment.27 
However, in all of these cases, the selection of 
indicators appears to be driven by the ease of mea-
surement and availability of data rather than by any 
clear conceptual or ethical framework. For exam-
ple, an alternative approach might consider what 
data would be necessary under UHC grounded in 
the right to health.
The substantive content of core obligations 
under the right to health 
There is obvious synergy between notions of uni-
versal access to affordable health services and the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health as 
entrenched in international law. We have previously 
identified key principles and imperatives stemming 
from the right to health that should guide the de-
sign of UHC:
• The inclusion of health care and the social deter-
minants of health in the right to health;
• The emphasis on non-discrimination as a guid-
ing principle and pragmatic arm of UHC;
• The imperative of participation and participato-
ry decision making;
• The prioritization of vulnerable and marginal-
ized groups;
• A focus on the principles of availability, accessi-
bility, acceptability, and quality; 
• Progressive realization; 
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• Core obligations; 
• Shared responsibility and international assistance;
• Accountability; 
• The framing influence of rights discourse; and
• Rights-based advocacy and litigation.28 
These principles assist in defining some of the more 
ambiguous and contentious aspects of UHC in rela-
tion to coverage/universality, services, and finances. 
Furthermore, international human rights 
treaties provide some direction as to what health 
services should be covered under UHC anchored 
in the right to health. For instance, article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) indicates that for states 
to achieve the goal of the right to the highest attain-
able standard of physical and mental health, they 
must take steps to reduce infant mortality; improve 
environmental and industrial hygiene; prevent, 
treat, and control epidemic, endemic, occupational, 
and other diseases; and create conditions to assure 
medical services and attention in the event of sick-
ness.29 However, what the ICESCR’s drafters meant 
by these steps was not specified at the time of their 
release. Moreover, much confusion ensued given 
that state duties under the ICESCR are limited 
to progressive realization within a maximum of 
available resources. Since article 12 did not specify 
what minimum or maximum level of health care 
satisfied the requirements of progressive realiza-
tion within maximum available resources, member 
states ended up applying sometimes dramatically 
varying standards. 
Subsequent authoritative interpretations of 
the right to health offer two helpful frameworks 
for assessing essential health care services. The first 
is the AAAQ framework, which reflects the idea 
that health facilities, goods, and services should be 
available in sufficient quantities; accessible physi-
cally, economically, and without discrimination; 
acceptable in medical, ethical, and cultural terms; 
and of good quality. The definition of accessibili-
ty is particularly relevant for considerations of 
UHC since it includes non-discriminatory access, 
requiring inclusion of the most vulnerable and 
marginalized sections of the population. Discrim-
ination is specified as extending to the prohibited 
grounds recognized in human rights law: race, color, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, property, birth, physical 
or mental disability, health status (including HIV/
AIDS), sexual orientation, and civil, political, social, 
or other status. This principle underscores the im-
portance of considering the needs of marginalized 
groups when implementing and monitoring UHC 
and in particular to disaggregate data according to 
the grounds just mentioned. Moreover, “economic 
accessibility” has significant implications for UHC, 
since it requires that services be equitable and afford-
able for all, including socially disadvantaged groups, 
whether these are privately or publicly provided. 
The second and related way that the right 
to health helps define the content of UHC comes 
from the concept of core obligations developed 
by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. The committee introduced core 
obligations in order to limit the risk of governments 
unjustifiably invoking the principle of progressive 
realization (whereby achievement of the right to 
health might take time in light of limited resources) 
to deny health care or take very little action. Thus, 
the committee suggests that states hold “minimum 
core obligations” not subject to progressive realiza-
tion or resource limitations, which ensures, at the 
very least, the fulfillment of minimum essential 
levels of each right.30 
The concept of core obligations has drawn con-
siderable scholarly fire given that it is not explicitly 
referenced in the ICESCR text.31 We do not wish to 
re-litigate this point in great detail here, other than 
to mention that while it is true that the term “core 
obligations” does not appear in either the treaty text 
or drafting papers, several discussions during the 
treaty’s drafting legitimate its later development. 
These include debates about the imperative of mit-
igating the risk posed by limitations of the right 
to health in the name of progressive realization 
under article 2, including through the elaboration 
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of minimum standards for ICESCR rights.32 More 
fundamentally, irrespective of its genealogy, the 
concept of core obligations has definitively entered 
legal interpretations of international social and 
economic rights, such as the right to health.33 To 
this extent, we adopt a relatively positivist approach 
to the legitimacy of core obligations in our analysis 
of their potential contribution to UHC. 
Much of the debate on core obligations arises 
from the committee’s interpretation in General 
Comment No. 14 on the right to health, published 
in 2000. Here, the committee expands on its earlier 
suggestion that under the right to health, core ob-
ligations would include “essential primary health 
care.”34 In General Comment No. 14, the committee 
interprets core obligations under the right to health 
to include (1) ensuring non-discriminatory access to 
health facilities, goods, and services, especially for 
vulnerable and marginalized people; (2) ensuring 
access to food, basic shelter, housing, sanitation, 
and water; (3) providing essential drugs as defined 
by WHO; (4) ensuring the equitable distribution of 
health facilities, goods, and services and (5) adopting 
a national public health strategy and plan of action 
addressing the concerns of the entire population, 
devised through a participatory process that pays 
particular attention to vulnerable and marginalized 
groups.35 In identifying these aspects, the committee 
indicates that this interpretation is drawn from the 
Declaration of Alma-Ata, read in conjunction with 
the Programme of Action of the International Con-
ference on Population and Development.36 
What is significant about the 2000 interpre-
tation is that the committee moves from a fairly 
substantive notion of core obligations as essential 
primary health care to a far more procedural 
and structural approach encompassing equitable 
distribution, non-discrimination, and a participa-
tory national plan of action. The only health care 
intervention specified is essential medicines; there 
is far more explication of the social determinants 
of health (minimum essential food, basic shelter, 
housing and sanitation, and water). Other sub-
stantive components of primary health care are 
listed separately but as obligations of “comparable 
priority” in relation to reproductive, maternal, 
and child health care; immunization against ma-
jor infectious diseases; the prevention, treatment, 
and control of epidemic and endemic diseases; 
health education and access to information; and 
appropriate training for health personnel.37 
The challenge of interpreting core 
obligations 
General Comment No. 14 is a watershed moment 
for the core obligations under the right to health, 
for it demarcates “essential” aspects of the right 
to health as a baseline of protection regardless of 
any given country’s shortage of national resources 
or international assistance. In addition, actions to 
realize these aspects are located within a legally 
binding framework that can have considerable 
normative and political effects. However, it is hard 
for the definition of minimum core obligations in 
General Comment No. 14 to practically support 
these ambitions. 
First, beyond essential medicines and un-
derlying determinants (such as food, basic shelter, 
housing, sanitation, and water), it is not clear which 
health services fall within the core. Primary health 
care is not explicitly listed as a core obligation; 
moreover, much of what we might expect to see in 
an obligation to provide essential primary health 
care is explicitly placed outside the core obligations, 
under obligations of comparable priority. Yet it is 
unclear what the relationship is between obliga-
tions of comparable priority and minimum core 
obligations. In other words, if obligations of com-
parable priority are not minimum core obligations, 
can they be limited by progressive realization or 
limited resources? 
General Comment No. 14 does not sufficient-
ly address the question of the resources necessary 
to meet core obligations; it merely emphasizes 
that states cannot justify noncompliance under 
any circumstances.38 The role of international as-
sistance and cooperation—part of the principle of 
shared responsibility, which is key to ensuring the 
universality of human rights and is enshrined in 
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article 2(1) of the ICESCR—is strongly reasserted 
as applying to core obligations.39 However, the 
committee fails to develop a process or specify 
criteria for assessing when a state has expended its 
maximum available resources, thus triggering the 
obligations of international assistance and coop-
eration specified in paragraph 45. The committee 
also fails to suggest a burden-sharing mechanism 
for managing this shared responsibility to realize 
the core obligations.40 This failure to clarify the 
international assistance obligations of wealthy 
states while specifying that poorer countries hold 
strong duties to meet core obligations irrespective 
of resources leaves the core open to the charge 
that it places financially unrealistic obligations on 
poorer countries. 
Finally, it is unclear whether minimum core 
obligations are intended to apply universally or 
to be tailored to national settings. The committee 
indicates that core obligations should provide a 
universally applicable “bottom line” of essential 
health care, in contrast to a standard that shifts 
from country to country depending on available 
resources.41 However, a one-size-fits-all approach 
to minimum core health services may be inappro-
priate given differences in the burden of disease, 
both among countries and within them. For ex-
ample, notwithstanding the existence of a WHO 
list, products designated as essential medicines 
are often determined nationally, or in some cases 
sub-nationally.42
Other human rights committees have attempt-
ed to fill the substantive gap by extending core 
obligations to primary health services generally. For 
example, General Comment No. 15 issued in 2003 
by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) holds that states have core obligations to 
ensure universal coverage of high-quality primary 
health services, including prevention, health promo-
tion, care and treatment, and essential drugs.43 This 
interpretation goes far beyond General Comment 
No. 14’s terser definition, which identifies only es-
sential drugs, and even beyond its earlier suggestion 
that core obligations extended to essential primary 
health care. The timing and wording of the CRC’s 
General Comment No. 15 suggests an effort to define 
the right to health in the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child in relation to ongoing debates over the 
SDGs and to UHC in particular.  
What do core obligations under the right 
to health offer UHC?
While the interpretation of the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights regarding 
core obligations is markedly deficient, it is notably 
clearer than extant definitions of UHC.44 In this 
light, the remainder of this paper considers what 
the right to health’s core obligations require of 
“essential health care services and medicines” with 
respect to achieving SDG 3.8. This question can be 
addressed in terms of the interrelated questions of 
what health care services and medicines are includ-
ed and who is covered. 
Core obligations and services 
UHC’s focus on essential services is clearly consistent 
with the core obligation to provide essential primary 
health care. However, General Comment No. 14 pro-
vides limited guidance on which elements, beyond 
essential medicines, must incontrovertibly be in-
cluded in essential primary health care. Certainly if 
the implication of this inclusion is that WHO deter-
minations of “essential” health interventions provide 
an authoritative indication of other core obligations, 
then the General Comment No. 14 definition of core 
obligations could feasibly be expanded accordingly.45 
Yet even if such interpretations provide clarity on 
specific services under cognate areas of health care, 
such as women’s sexual and reproductive health 
care, they do not necessarily clarify the broader 
category of health care services. Thus, interpretative 
clarity on core obligations stalls at essential med-
icines, a point that becomes crucial given the UN 
General Assembly’s inclusion of essential medicines 
in two locations within SDG 3 (as both a target and 
a means of implementation, in SDG 3.8 and SDG 3.b, 
respectively), and which indicates access to essential 
medicine’s high prioritization by UN member states. 
Such emphasis will be a major challenge for UHC 
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achievement in light of the exorbitant cost of some 
pharmaceuticals. The affordability challenge is high-
lighted since the indicator for SDG 3.8 proposed by 
the IAEG-SDG relates to “affordable medicines” and 
not just “affordable essential medicines.”46 
However, beyond medicines and some social 
determinants, the focus of the right to health’s core 
obligations is far more on processes (e.g., non-discrim-
ination, equitable distributions, and plans of actions) 
than on outcomes. Indeed, this is the case even with 
regard to essential medicines, since the determination 
of what is an essential medicine is made nationally, 
irrespective of WHO’s determination based on global 
epidemiological and economic conditions. 
Thus, the core obligations do not prescribe 
a globally applicable and fixed set of health care 
benefits but rather a framework for action that 
encompasses non-discrimination (including af-
fordability), equity, participatory decision making, 
essential medicines, and social determinants of 
health, which may enhance existing approaches to 
the prioritization of health care interventions.47 It is 
possible that this framework could do much to ad-
vance toward an equitable and rights-based health 
system. We cannot disagree with this as a principled 
approach, although it is hard to accept a concept 
of essential care that includes essential drugs but 
not emergency obstetric care, immunization, or in-
fectious disease control. This anomaly undermines 
the broader legitimacy of General Comment No. 
14’s interpretation of core obligations. 
Essential medicines were perhaps included in 
the core obligations under General Comment No. 
14 to acknowledge the contentious and political 
nature of access to pharmaceuticals. However, and 
in turn, the committee might have excluded other 
measures out of a hesitance to place unreasonable 
demands on poorer countries by identifying too 
many substantive core obligations. This is one area 
where instead of looking to the right to health to 
augment global health policy, we might do the 
opposite and consider the specification of SDG 3’s 
health targets and of tracer interventions in these 
domains as bolstering what should be considered to 
fall within a state’s core obligations. Certainly the 
interplay between global health policy and right-
to-health interpretations is a rich area for future 
research, especially considering the committee’s 
declaration that the Declaration of Alma-Ata and 
the International Conference on Population and 
Development grounded its decision making around 
the core obligations.
Core obligations and coverage 
While the committee adopted a largely procedur-
al approach to core obligations beyond essential 
medicines and the social determinants of health, 
non-discrimination, which is the clearest and 
most definitive of these obligations, is not simply 
procedural. With respect to UHC, non-discrimi-
nation has very substantive implications for what 
is covered, as well as who is covered, and has the 
potential to address structural barriers that impede 
access to health care. Non-discrimination specifies 
a focus on the most vulnerable and marginalized 
sections of society, particularly on denials of health 
care that fall within prohibited grounds (race, 
color, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, 
physical or mental disability, health status, sexual 
orientation, and civil, political, social, or other sta-
tus). These grounds offer critical protection against 
discriminatory exclusions in nationally determined 
models of UHC. In addition, the emphasis on af-
fordability elevates socio-economic status to one of 
the grounds for discrimination, meaning that UHC 
which is not affordable to all would violate core ob-
ligations under the right to health. These grounds 
will be very important in implementing UHC and 
especially in monitoring implementation. They 
bolster the “equity stratifiers” of sex, age, socio-eco-
nomic position, and geography that the IAEG-SDG 
has proposed for disaggregating data collection in 
order to ensure that UHC does not exclude vulner-
able groups.48 A pressing question for UHC will 
be the extent to which non-nationals, particularly 
those lacking documents, are included, given how 
some high-income countries have excluded certain 
classes of migrants from health care in the past.49 
That non-discrimination has very substan-
tive meaning is apparent in the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women’s 
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identification of non-discrimination as a core ob-
ligation under the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
recognizing that states have an “immediate and con-
tinuous obligation to condemn discrimination.”50 
In a 2011 decision regarding a woman who died in 
childbirth, the committee found Brazil in violation 
of its core obligation of non-discrimination for fail-
ing to assure appropriate maternal health services 
for all.51 It held that Brazil’s “continued high rates of 
maternal mortality … constitute[d] a systematic fail-
ure to prioritize and protect women’s basic human 
rights” and that the grossly negligent health care 
given to a poor black women constituted a form of 
de facto discrimination.52 This finding indicates that 
non-discrimination offers a framework for identi-
fying and addressing systemic discriminations in 
health care that intensify along axes of gender, race, 
socio-economic status, sexuality, and disability. The 
implication of the committee’s decision is that inad-
equate health care affecting primarily marginalized 
and poor communities violates core obligations un-
der the right to health. This too is a very important 
frame for shaping UHC, demonstrating the scope 
for advocacy and litigation.
The risks of UHC and core obligations
While core obligations can shape UHC, there are 
risks in focusing too narrowly on them to the ex-
clusion of aspects of the wider SDG agenda. The 
first is the risk that despite the legal obligation 
to progressively realize the right to health, core 
obligations will nonetheless act as a ceiling rather 
than floor for the right to health, transforming it 
from health for all to basic health care for the poor 
only. There is a similar danger of UHC reducing 
health care downwards, without specifying a floor 
for essential health care itself.53 The other related 
threat is that even a well-defined essential health 
package consistent with core obligations will of-
fer selective rather than comprehensive primary 
health care, and doing so could reinforce stratified 
systems of health rights.54 This is captured in the 
argument that health care for the poor often ends 
up being poor health care, so that the more we 
“target benefits at the poor only … the less likely 
we are to reduce poverty and inequality.”55 Indeed, 
scholarship suggests that societies pursuing uni-
versalistic policies have higher levels of equity than 
those that rely on selectivity, at least in part because 
there is an “elective affinity between the preference 
for universalism and other measures, such as high 
progressive taxes.”56
The risk of UHC becoming targeted rather 
than comprehensive health care, with inadequate 
attention to health systems strengthening, is great 
since states live not in an abstracted world domi-
nated by the SDGs but in the real world, where 
policies to implement UHC exist alongside ongoing 
austerity, financial crises, free trade agreements, 
and pressures to commodify health services, all of 
which directly threaten policies on access to med-
icines and sustainable health financing.57 Indeed, it 
is argued that the ambiguity of UHC makes it par-
ticularly susceptible to exploitation, particularly 
within the market-driven global environment.58 
Conclusion
As we shift into an era of implementing and moni-
toring both UHC and the SDGs, a priority for civil 
society and academia must be to guard against re-
strictions on universality, coverage, and financing 
that fall short of human rights obligations, as well 
as against overly abstracted notions of UHC. UHC 
frames, just like the cube popularized by WHO, 
literally ask us to think inside a box which excludes 
key enablers of UHC. These key enablers include 
social movements and rights-based advocacy and 
litigation, which are critical for developing UHC 
in all settings, as well as health systems strength-
ening, which is required to assure the adequacy of 
services.59 Moreover, such frames do not adequately 
acknowledge the existence of risks, such as those 
arising from political and economic pressures 
to commodify and defund health care. National 
determinations of UHC in particular are likely to 
become critical battlegrounds around affordability 
and inclusion; from a human rights perspective, this 
is where participatory policies and social move-
ments will become critical factors in rolling out a 
more equitable version of UHC.60
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